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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
A. Is the trial court's refusal to find, after argument,
whether the house payments made by the Appellant are alimony or a
property settlement, error, which requires the Supreme Court to
make a finding as to the character of this payment?
B.

If the payment is characterized as alimony, is the

Plaintiff's full time career employment after the time of the
Decree a substantial enough change in circumstances to warrant
terminating the payment?
C.

If the house

payment requirement is characterized

as a property settlement, should it be suspended due to lack of
consideration, which makes the payment inequitable?
D.

Does the trial court have a duty to see that all

agreements by the parties to a divorce are equitable whether or
not the parties are represented by counsel, and should the court
have discovered

whatever facts are necessary to make such a

determination?
E.

Does the trial

court have a duty to remedy an

inequitable agreement, especially when the inequity is made more
severe due to a change in circumstances, once a party to it has
petitioned the Court for relief,

or to at least modify

the

inequitable portion of the agreement in such a way as to remedy
the inequity with the least adverse impact on the position of the
other party?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature

of

the

Case.

This is an appeal by the defendant, John Kerschner from

an order denying his Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce.
B. Course of the Proceedings.
The parties

were

divorced

on

May

20, 1983. The

Defendant filed a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce which was
heard October 3, 1984 before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby.
C.

Disposition in the District Court.

The Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, of the,Second Judicial
District

ruling from the bench October 3, 1984, the Defendant's

Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce was denied, but the
Court would

not find whether

the payment was alimony or a

property settlement, and denied the Petition on both grounds.
Accordingly, no written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
were entered,

since the matter had been argued and was not

decided.
D. Statement of Material Facts.
The Parties were divorced on

May 20, 1983.

The Decree

of Divorce was entered by consent of the parties, with the
Defendant/Appellant husband

(hereinafter Defendant)

ordered

to

pay the sum of $200.00 per child per month as child support, for
a total of $600.00 per month.

The Defendant was also ordered in

paragraph 7 of the Decree (Appendix A) to pay the house payment
on the marital residence in the sum of $276.00 per month until
the Plaintiff/Respondent wife (hereinafter Plaintiff) remarries,
cohabits with another adult male, no longer uses the premises as
her principal place of residence, the youngest child of the
parties reaches age 18, or the home is sold, whichever comes
v

first.

However, the equity in the home was divided at the time

of the Decree, with Defendant to receive the sum of $12,340.00
upon the occurrence of one of the above contingencies.

The first

certain contingency is the date the youngest child of the parties
reaches age 18, which will be in 11 years. If the Defendant
should pay the house payment until that time he will have paid
approximately $36,000.00 to the Plaintiff, for which he receives
no interest, equity, or other offset of any kind. The Defendant
paid temporary child support and alimony to the Plaintiff prior
to the divorce and paid the house payment for 13 months before he
petitioned the Court to modify the Decree of Divorce. Since the
parties' divorce in June of 1983 the Plaintiff has changed from
an unemployed housewife to an employed teacher for nine months of
the year,

complete

with pension

and other benefits,

which

resulted in an increase in her income from $876.00 per month
(child support and alimony), to approximately $1876.00 per month,
which is based upon her receiving her salary for 12 months of the
year and does not include her benefits , which increase her base
salary by approximately

30%.

Based

upon this change

of

circumstances, along with the Defendant's remarriage to a woman
with children of her own from a prior marriage and the attendant
costs thereto, the Defendant petitioned the trial court for a
modification of his Decree of Divorce, requesting relief from the
obligation to pay the payment on the house, or in the alternative
to modify the terms of the requirement

so that he would receive

some offset, such as all or part of the equity built up during
the time he pays the payment, plus interest on the outstanding
\i

balance of his share of the equity. All of his requests on that
issue were denied. There were other issues which were dealt with
in the Petition which are not the subject of this appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A.
that he

Counsel

for Defendant argued that the requirement

pay the Plaintiff's house payment in the sum of $276.00

per month, although not designated as such, was alimony because
it was not a sum certain and as such, could be modified upon a
showing of a change in the circumstances of the parties.
for Plaintiff

argued

that

said

requirement

settlement and as such could not be modified.

was

Counsel

a property

The trial court,

after hearing this argument, would not decide the nature of the
payment, which was error. As a result, the Defendant does not
know if he can, in the future, petition the Court again, or
whether this appeal is his last recourse.

If a trial Court fails

or refuses to decide an issue presented and argued before it,
especially in matters of equity, the Supreme Court has the power
to decide that issue, and to issue appropriate findings of fact
and conclusions of law in accordance with the decision of the
Supreme Court.
B.

The house payment requirement is

alimony and is

modifiable by the Defendant's showing of a substantial change in
circumstances.

At the time of the divorce, the Plaintiff was an

unemployed housewife with a teaching certificate and an income of
$876.00 per month.

Thirteen months later she had completed one

full year of teaching, and had permanent employment as such,
vii

complete with benefits and a twelve month income of approximately
$1,000.00 per month,

bringing

her

total

monthly

income

approximately $1876.00 per month, not including benefits.

to

Since

her obtaining employment more than doubled her income,

the

Defendant claims that this qualifies as a substantial change in
Plaintiff's circumstances

which would warrant a change in his

obligations to the Plaintiff.
C.

If the payment requirement is a property settlement,

it should be suspended because it has no consideration,
as a result is patently inequitable.

and

In order for a payment to

be classified as a property settlement in a Decree of Divorce, it
must be paid to compensate the party receiving the payment for
real or personal property retained by the paying party and must
be a sum certain which is not terminable on certain contingencies
as required in Fletcher v^ Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980).
The essence of this arrangement is the requirement that the
paying party receive something for his payments and pay a certain
sum of money for those items.

In this case, the marital property

was equitably divided without this payment being considered, and
as a result the Defendant is receiving nothing for his payment.
This arrangement is unfair, and the trial court found that it is
"unusual"(T 37).
it,

The equitable powers of the trial court enable

and require it to modify

decrees,

and

the

trial

inequitable provisions of its

court

should

have

suspended

the

requirement that the Defendant pay the Plaintiff's house payment.
D.

The trial court has a duty to discover whatever

facts are necessary to determine whether or not an agreement by

t h e p a r t i e s t o a d i v o r c e i s e q u i t a b l e , whether or not t h e
are represented

by c o u n s e l .

court held that

In t h i s

case, however,

and t h a t

have challenged

l e a s t made i t

equity.

at

the time or at

by c o u n s e l

The C o u r t ' s

equitable,
obvious

(T 3 8 ) .

duty

is

but

as

trial

This

to

see

to

why

the

parties

then the t r i a l

is

error

that

the

and h a s a d u t y t o do s o .

a duty to a s c e r t a i n
house payment,

have

court

is

"the Court

clear to

in

being

a court

agreement

determine

the

in a p o s i t i o n to

ascertain

the t r i a l

c o u r t had

was a g r e e i n g t o p a y

can i t h o l d

now.

As a r e s u l t

of t h e t r i a l

facts

behind the agreement

t h e t i m e t h e s t i p u l a t i o n was h e a r d ,
a

duty

to

agreement,
refuse

modify
and i t

the

Decree

to

great

was m a n i f e s t

court's
its

t h e same t r i a l

injustice

the
for

Only

t h e Defendant

despite

remedy

the

to

failure

to

concern

at

c o u r t now h a s

inequity
the t r i a l

of

the

court

to

t o do s o .
E.

p o r t i o n of
by

the

not

specific

why t h e D e f e n d a n t

to

p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h i s payment would c o n t i n u e f o r many y e a r s .

his

are

a

In t h i s c a s e ,

c o u r t h a s done t h a t

of

If the facts are

and t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r he u n d e r s t o o d

when t h e t r i a l

the

agreements

agreed

to

would

for both p a r t i e s

n o t t o r e l y on c o u n s e l t o do s o .

provision,
them,

it

a s t o w h a t you a r e d o i n g "

represented

the

"The C o u r t h a s an o b l i g a t i o n t o l e t them a g r e e

w h a t t h e y w a n t t o a g r e e t o " (T 3 8 ) ,

parties

parties

The t r i a l

a D e c r e e of D i v o r c e ,

a change

agreement

c o u r t h a s a d u t y t o modify any

of

circumstances

was i n e q u i t a b l e

from

whether
of

the

its
ix

that

inequitable

inequity

parties

inception,

or

is

caused

whether

once t h e

the
trial

court realizes that the agreement is indeed unfair.

In this case

the trial court found the agreement to be "unusual" which is
tantamount to finding that the agreement is unfair, since it is
"unusual" for a person to be required to pay for something, only
to receive nothing for it.

The Defendant also asked the trial

court in lieu of removing the payment entirely, to grant him all
or part of the remaining house equity, and to give him interest
on that equity.

This modification would not have changed the

daily living condition of the Plaintiff and the children, and
would have allowed the Defendant to receive something, albeit in
the future, for his payment.

The trial court, however, refused

even this less intrusive modification,

and

in light of the

conclusion that the agreement is "unusual" it was error for the
Court to refuse to do so.

x

ARGUMENT
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO FIND, AFTER ARGUMENT,
WHETHER THE HOUSE PAYMENT MADE BY DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFF IS
ALIMONY OR PROPERTY SETTLEMENT IS ERROR AND REQUIRES THE SUPREME
COURT TO MAKE A FINDING AS TO THE CHARACTER OF THIS PAYMENT.
The Defendant's Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce
asked the trial court, among other things, to determine whether
the house payment requirement, which is the subject of this
appeal, should be characterized as a property settlement or
alimony.

The Decree is silent as to the classification of the

payment, and the classification bears greatly on the future
modiflability of the payment.

Counsel agree that if the payment

is alimony then the Defendant could petition the Court for its
modification again at a later date if circumstances warrant, even
if his appeal is otherwise denied.

If the payment is classified

as a property settlement and not modified by the Supreme Court as
a result of this appeal, the Defendant
attempting to modify it at a later date.

will be barred

from

This difference was an

important issue to the parties, and despite vociferous argument
by

Counsel,

classification

the

trial

court

of the payment.

refused
In fact,

to

determine

the trial

the

court's

findings are so inconclusive that it was impossible for Counsel
to draft findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding this
hearing, as they would never agree on the classification and the
trial court gave them no guidance, let alone a decision.

The

trial court stated that "Defense counsel, of course, is saying
it's in the nature of alimony. It sure sounds like it, and yet
the stipulation clearly was that there is no alimony to be paid.
1

Plaintiff's counsel is saying it's obviously property settlement.
This is not obvious to me that it's property settlement." (T 38)
"It looks like it's probably in lieu of alimony and yet, agreed
there

is no

settlement."

such

thing

as alimony.

It could

be

property

(T40)

The Court then makes its final ruling, and states: "So I
am going to hold the—unusual as it is, the terms as it is, even
though it's there without any offsetting equity in the house even
though it says there's no alimony" (T 40).
This

ruling

leaves

Counsel

for

the

parties

in

an

impossible stalemate and no findings of fact or conclusions of
law were filed as a result.

Whenever a trial court leaves the

parties in such a position, it is reasonable for the parties to
appeal to the Supreme Court to decide the issue, especially in
matters of equity, and to ask the Supreme Court to issue findings
and conclusions in accordance with the decision of the Supreme
Court.
B. THE HOUSE PAYMENT MADE BY THE DEFENDANT IS ALIMONY
AND SHOULD BE TERMINATED, SINCE THE PLAINTIFF'S OBTAINING FULL
TIME CAREER EMPLOYMENT AFTER THE TIME OF THE DECREE IS A
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES.
This Court in Fletcher v^ Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1221 (Utah
1980) stated that "the alimony awarded in this action cannot be
deemed in the nature of a property settlement, for it is not a
sum certain but is terminable on certain contingencies."

In this

case, the house payment requirement is not a sum certain and
terminates when the last child reaches age 18, the plaintiff
remarries or cohabits with an adult male, the home is no longer
9

used as her principal place of residence, or when the house is
sold, whichever comes first.

The first reliable contingency, the

last child reaching age IS, will occur in approximately 11 years.
However, any of the other contingencies could occur before that
time, so the Plaintiff has no idea the final amount that the
Defendant will pay to her*

Because of this uncertainty, this

payment must be classified as alimony, and cannot be a property
settlement.
At the time of the parties* divorce, the Plaintiff was
an unemployed housewife with a teaching certificate and an income
of $876.00 per month which represented child support and the
house payment paid by
had

completed

the Defendadnt.

Thirteen months later she

one full year of teaching,

and had permanent

employment as such, complete with benefits and a twelve month
income- of approximately $1,000,00 per month, bringing her total
cash monthly income to approximately $1876.00 per month, not
counting her benefits which amount to an increase in her teaching
income of approximately 30%.
Since

Plaintiff's

obtaining

employment

more

than

doubled her income, The Defendant claims that this qualifies as a
substantial change in her circumstances which would warrant a
change in the Defendant's obligations to

the Plaintiff.

The standards used in fixing an alimony award are:
1.

the financial conditions and needs of the wife;

2. the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient
income for herself;
3.

the ability of the husband to provide support.

In this case the parties were married for twelve years
but the Plaintiff did have her teaching certificate and as a
result had marketable skills. Applying the above-stated standard,
her unemployed
required

status at the time of the decree would have

a reasonable

sum

of alimony

for a time,

but

the

prospects for the Plaintiff to provide a sufficient income for
herself were excellent and alimony should terminate when those
prospects have been realized.
The above-stated standards should also be applied when
determining whether an alimony award in a Decree of Divorce
should be modified. Plaintiff has now proven that she is able to
produce a sufficient income for herself, but she is still in need
of child support to help with the support of the children, which
is $600.00 per month for three children and which the Defendant
does not dispute.

Her general financial condition is good, and

is better than at the time of the Decree.
Defendant

to provide

The ability of the

support has been diminished

by his

remarriage to a woman who has children of her own, which can
result in as many as seven children residing in the Defendant's
home

on his

visitation

weekends.

The Defendant

is

making

only $1,000.00 per year more than he was three years ago (T 3).
The

most

substantial

change

in

circumstances

remains

the

Plaintiff's employment which more than doubled her income.

Not

only that, her job provides a retirement plan, medical insurance,
and other benefits which will put her in a similar, if not better
financial

position

than

the

Defendant
4

in her

later

years.

Accordingly, the Defendant should be relieved of the requirement
that he pay the Plaintiff's house payment of $276.00 per month
due to her substantial change in circumstances.
This Court held in Haslam v^_ Haslam, 657 P.2d 757 (Utah
1982) that there had been a substantial change in circumstances
where

Mrs.

Haslam

had

obtained

employment,

experienced

a

substantial increase in income and had accumulated some savings
and Mr. Haslam's income had not increased since the time of the
divorce.

In that case the parties were married for 21 years and

had been divorced for 17 years.

The financial situation of the

parties to this appeal is similar, except that both parties were
much younger at the time of the divorce and were not married for
nearly so long.
The

Court

in

Has].aiii held

that

"the

change

in

circumstances required to justify a modification of a divorce
decree varies with the type of modification sought"
held

and also

that
"With respect to modifying alimony, this Court has
recently stated that provisions in the original decree
of divorce granting alimony, child support, and the
like must be readily susceptible to alteration at a
later date, as the needs which such provisions were
designed to fill are subject to rapid and unpredictable
change." [Citatiton deleted]

Id., at 758.
doubled

since

In this case the Plaintiff's income has more than
the time

of the Decree,

she has

substantial

retirement and other job benefits, and the Defendant's income has
not substantially increased, but his obligations have increased.
As a result, the Defendant should relieved of the obligation to
pay the Plaintiff's house payment.

C. THE PAYMENT MADE BY THE DEFENDANT, IF A PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT, SHOULD BE SUSPENDED SINCE IT IS PATENTLY INEQUITABLE,
HAS NO CONSIDERATION, AND WAS FOUND TO BE "UNUSUAL" BY THE TRIAL
COURT.
In order

for a cash payment to be classified as a

property settlement rather than alimony in a decree of divorce, it
must be paid to the other party as compensation for real or
personal property retained by the paying party and must be a sum
certain Fletcher v^ Fletcher 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980).

In this

case the personal and real property of the parties was equitably
divided between them without any payment required.
property

is disclosed

Plaintiff

present

furniture.

in

the

residence,

decree,

and

various

All marital

consists

cars

and

of

the

household

There has never been any evidence presented

to

indicate that there was other property retained by the Defendant
for which he was paying the Plaintiff.

Even the equity in the

marital residence was divided and reduced to a sum certain of
$12,340.00 to be paid upon various contingencies. A requirement
that the Defendant pay the Plaintiff the sum of $36,000.00 over
the next 11 years without any offset or consideration is patently
inequitable.

Even the trial court

found the payment to be

"unusual" (T 37).
This Court in Davis v. Davis 655 P.2d 672 (Utah 1982)
determined

that

such

a

requirement

was

inequitable

under

practically idential facts, finding that
". . .the trial court upset the equity of that division
by requiring the defendant to make a further
substantial investment in the property without any
corresponding benefit to him. . .The defendant will be
required to make post decree payments nearly double
6

the equity awarded to him. This was unfair to him and
weighted the division of the property heavily in the
plaintiff's favor. Fairness dictates that he should
realize something out of the increased equity which
will result from his providing the funds to retire
the second mortgage. [Citation omitted]
Id., at 673.

In Davis the defendant was ordered to pay the

second mortgage on the marital residence in lieu of alimony/ and
his share of the house equity was determined at the time of the
divorce.

In the present case, the Defendant will pay $36,000.00

to the Plaintiff by the time the last child reaches age 18 which
is three times the $12,340.00 in house equity awarded to him in
the decree.

Such an agreement was found by this Court to be

inequitable in Davis and it is inequitable in the present case as
well.
The equitable powers of the trial court enable it, and
require it to modify inequitable provisions of its decrees, and
the trial court should have relieved the Defendant from the
requirement that he pay the Plaintiff's house payment, and it was
an abuse of discretion for it to fail to do so.
D.
THE TRIAL COURT HAS A DUTY TO SEE THAT ALL
AGREEMENT S BY THE PARTIES TO A DIVORCE ARE EQUITABLE WHETHER OR
NOT THE PARTIES ARE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AND TO DISCOVER
WHATEVER FACTS ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE SUCH A DETERMINATION.
The trial court, especially in equitable matters, has a
duty to determine whether or not agreements between the parties
to a divorce are equitable.

The fact that one or both of the

parties is represented by counsel does not alter the duty of the
court.

In this case, however, after the Defendant petitioned the

trial court to modify the decree of divorce, the trial court held
that "the Court has an obligation to let them agree to what they
7

want to agree to" (T 38).

"The Court would have challenged it at

the time or at least made it clear to the parties as to what you
are doing" but for both parties being represnted by counsel (T
38).

The trial court's duty is to see that the agreements are

equitable, not to rely on counsel to do so.

If the trial court

has any suspicion as to the inequitability of any provision of
the agreement, the trial court has a duty to ascertain whatever
facts are necessary to satisfy itself that the provision is fair.
The trial court has the power to change any part of an agreement
between parties to a divorce

should the it be convinced that it

was inequitable. In this case, the trial court had a duty to
ascertain why the Defendant was agreeing to pay the house payment
when the equity was already divided, and to determine whether he
understood the great possibility that this payment could continue
for many years, possibly more years than a straightforward
alimony payment.

Only when the trial court had made

those

determinations could it now hold the Defendant to his agreement.
The trial court's failure to determine the facts behind the
original agreement was error and now requires that same court, in
the interests of justice, to modify the decree of divorce to
remedy

the

inequity,

especially

in light of its

increased

unfairness due to the Plaintiff's full-time employment.
E. THE TRIAL COURT HAS A DUTY, ONCE A PARTY TO AN
INEQUITABLE AGREEMENT HAS PETITIONED THE TRIAL COURT FOR RELIEF,
TO GRANT THAT RELIEF OR TO MODIFY THE INEQUITABLE PORTION OF THE
AGREEMENT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO REMEDY THE INEQUITY WITH THE LEAST
ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE POSITON OF THE OTHER PARTY.
In this case, the trial court found the requirement
8

that

the Defendant pay the Plaintiff's house payment

"unusual" and
represented

also

stated

by Counsel

that had

that

the

the trial

Defendant
court

to be

not

been

"would

have

challenged it at the time or at least made it clear to the
parties as to what you are doing" (T 37, 38). This is tantamount
to a finding that the agreement is inequitable, and accordingly
the Defendant should be relieved of further payments on the
Plaintiff's house.
However, there is no evidence of any wrongdoing on
the Plaintiff's part, and in light of that the trial court

could

have found that eliminating the payment entirely would result in
hardship upon her.

If that were the case, the court then had a

duty to at least modify the decree in such a way as to remedy the
inequity while affecting the Plaintiff as little as possible. The
Defendant reasonably requested the court, in lieu of removing the
payment entirely, to allow him to keep all or part of the house
equity accrued at the time the last child reaches age IS, the
house is sold, or some other contingency sooner in time. John
also asked for interest on the unpaid balance, but essentially he
requested the trial court to rectify the problem, and indicated
that he would be amenable to a flexilble decision that gave the
Defendant compensation for his payment even if the trial court
could not eliminate it entirely.

This the trial court refused to

do, and in light of the facts and circumstances of the parties,
was error.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant

petitioned
S

the trial court in this

matter for a modification of his divorce decree.

The trial court

refused to decide whether the requirement that the Defendant pay
the Plaintiff's house payment was a property settlement rather
than alimony.
decree,

It them decided that it would not modify the

despite the Plaintiff's

full-time employment

following

the divorce which more than doubled her income, and despite the
trial court's finding that the payment was "unusual".

As a

result, the trial court has erred in failing to decide a major
question asked of it, in failing to modify the divorce decree of
the parties despite a substantial change in the circumstances of
the parties, in failing to determine whether the stipulation of
the parties

was

equitable

in the

first

place,

and

upon

determining that it was "unusual", the trial court has erred in
refusing to modify the decree in any way.

As a result, the

Supreme Court is in a position to modify the decree to remove
the Defendant's responsibility for the Plaintiff's house payment
or otherwise modify the divorce decree to remedy the inequity
presently contained therein, to determine whether the payment is
alimony or a property settlement, and to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law in accordance with its decision.
Respectfully submitted this 5 ^ day of May, 1985.

BY y^

cm^

Zfkne Allen
Attorney for Appellant
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RONALD W. PERKINS
VLAHOS, PERKINS & SHARP
Attorney for Plaintiff
Legal Forum Building
24 47 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-2464

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DIANA KERSCHNER,
Plaintiff,

/
/

DECREE

OF

DIVORCE

vs .

/

JOHN H. KERSCHNER,

/

Civil No. 1-3273-5

Defendant.

/

3000

This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the
23th day of February, 1983, before the Honorable Douglas L.
Cornaby, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court, sitting
without a jury, and the plaintiff being personally present
3.116. represented by hei dttOMie^ ^ Ronald W. ire-LKiris. a.ud the
defendant being personally present and represented by his attorney, Walker E. Juiderson, and the parties having entered into
an oral stipulation governing their respective property rights,
custody, support, alimony, attorney's fees, and all other kindred
rights, and the plaintiff having been sworn and testified in
open Court, and the Court having approved the oral stipulation

-2of the parties and being fully cognizant of all matters herein,
and the Court having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, separately stated in writing, HOW THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

That the plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce

from the defendant, same to become final on May 20, 19 33, provided same is signed and filed with the Court prior to such date.
2.

That the plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and

control of the three minor children of the parties, subject
o
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to the defendant's reasonable rights of visitation at reasonable
times and places.
3.

That the plaintiff is awarded the sum of $200.00 per

month per child as and for child support for three minor children.
4.

That the plaintiff shall retain as her personal property

the household furniture and furnishings, the 1976 Volare automobile,
as well as her personal belongings and effects,
5.

That the defendant shall retain as his sole property

the 197 9 Ford Courier, the tent trailer, the motorcycle, boat,
motor, all interest in defendant's IRA account, as well as
his personal belongings and effects.

-36.

That the plaintiff shall retain the marital home and

real property located at 55 South 4th West, Kaysville, Davis
County, State of Utah, subject to a lien in favor of the defen-*
dant in the sum of $12,340.00, which shall become due and payable
upon the following conditions:'
a.

Plaintiff should remarry, or

b.

That no other adult male lives in the home, or

c.

She should no longer use the premises as her prin-

cipal place of'residence, or
d.

The youngest child of the parties reaches the

age of majority, or
e.

The home be sold by the parties

, whichever of

the above conditions should occur first.
7*

That the defendant shall pay the sum of $276*00 to

United Savings & Loan as and for the house payment, until such
time as any of the conditions referred to in paragraph six (6)
should occur, whichever occurs first, but in no event shall
defendant be required **o p-y more than ^9^6

00 per month to

United Savings & Loan relative to such obligation,
8.

That the plaintiff shall be entitled to retain the

1982 income tax return in the approximate sum of $2,020.00,
and a check from the Terkelson Company,
a.

Plaintiff shall pay all utilities at the home and

maintain the home, building and premises in good condition and
repair.

-49.

That the parties shall each be entitled to retain

one-half the 1932 Utah State income tax refund and jointly pay taxes
10.

That the defendant shall maintain health, accident

and dental insurance on the minor children of the parties so
long as same is available through any place of employment,
and should future orthodontic expenses arise with respect to
the minor children, the plaintiff and defendant shall each'
be responsible for one-half of all sums not paid by insurance.
11.

That there'presently exists a savings account in the

approximate sum of $1,190.00, which account is in the names
of the parties three minor children, and the plaintiff and
the defendants1 names shall also be joined as a party to such
account, and such account shall be used for the benefit of
the three minor children upon mutual consent for its use by
the plaintiff and defendant.
12.

That the plaintiff waives her right to alimony, past,

present or future.
13 • That 5.t is proposed for the year 1983. that" the defendant
shall claim two of the parties minor children for income tax
purposes, and the plaintiff shall claim one minor child for
income tax purposes, and such procedure being alternated every
year* and it also being proposed that such tax exemption claims
may be altered by the mutual agreement of the plaintiff and
the defendant in any year the parties desire to alter the exemption claims.

-514.

That the defendant shall pay'to the plaintiff the

sum of $380.00 attorney's fees and costs in this action.
DATED this

Jj(

day of &&&(,

1983.

BY THE COURT:

'^^J^.^J^ (T\(J^^L

--

bOUGLAS L. ^ftRNABY,
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

STATE OF UTAH

WALKER E. ANDERSON,
Attorney for Defendant

COUNTY OF DAVIS
I THE UNDERSIGNED. CLERK OF THE DISTRICT
COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ANNEXED AND FOREGOING IS A TRUE
AND FULL COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON
PILE IN MY OFFICE AS SUCH CLERK.
W I T N E S S MY H
THIS.

SEAL O F SAID OFFICE^

DAY-

R0DNEY W. WALKER, CLERK

0
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FILED IH CLERK'S OFFICF
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JANE ALLEN (Bar No. 45)
A t t o r n e y for Defendant
261 East 300 South, S u i t e 150
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
Telephone:
(801) 355-1300

BY

DEPUTY CLLKK

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
M

DIANA KERSCHNER,

*

Plaintiff,

J
•

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
PETITION TO MODIFY

vs.
Civil No. 1-32735
JOHN H. KERSCHNER,
Defendant.
This matter came on for hearing on the 3rd day of October,
1984 before the Honorable Douglas L Cornaby.

The Plaintiff was

present with her counsel, C. Gerald Parker, Esq.
present with his counsel, Jane Allen, Esq.

The Defendant was

After hearing testimony

and argument, the Court makes the following Order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

The Decree of Divorce shall be modified to eliminate

paragraph 13 of the Decree, with the tax deduction of the parties
in regard to the minor children to be governed by the rule of the
IRS.
2.

Defendant's request that he be relieved of the

obligation to pay the house payment for the house presently
occupied by the Plaintiff is hereby denied.
3.

That paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce regarding

the maintenance of health, accident, and dental insurance on the
minor children shall remain unchanged.

4.

Defendant's request that the equity in the marital

residence be redetermined is hereby denied.
5.

The defendant may talk to the children on the tele-

phone without interference from the Plaintiff so long as such
calls are at reasonable times and duration.
6.

The parties are mutually restrained from harassing

7.

Each party shall bear their own attorney's fees and

8.

All other provisions of the Decree of Divorce not

the other.

costs.

herein amended shall remain in full force and effect.
DATED this

J

day of

_£)c

^ ^ Js^

1984.

BY THE COURT:

^=±±JL

^i^bi^/ii) Cornaby
District Court Judge
Approved as to form and
content:

C. Gerald Parker
Attorney for Plaintiff

, £ ^ W c >6//
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1

them but we submit, your Honor, that under the circumstances,

2

it's appropriate and proper for the decree to remain as it is

3

at the present time.

4

THE COURT:

Do you want one-minute rebuttal?

5

MS. ALLEN:

I just think it's clear, in looking at

6

this, that at best this particular provision for ongoing pay-

7

ments is a gray area.

It may not be alimony.

8

THE COURT:

Cray, meaning what?

9

MS. ALLEN:

Gray meaning it's not called alimony, but

10

it's not called property settlement.

11

and because of that the Court can probably quite reasonably

12

apply his equitable powers to see that something that is unfair

It's not called anything

131 does not continue for the next 10 or 12 years while he pays off
14 the house and only get $12,000 in equity even though he pays all)
15 the payments for all of the years on the house and since she
16 has already been awarded her half of the equity at the time of
17 the decree to keep it, obviously, the house was split.
18

She became quite immediately employed.

Usually alimony is

19 just to put the spouse who did not work, who bore the children,
20 back on her feet.

She is on her feet just fine and it seems

21 that it's just only the fair thing to do in this case is to
22 allow him not to have to pay this payment any more.
23

THE COURT:

24 payment first.

Thank you.

I will talk about the house

The Court doesn!t know why it's there.

It's a

25 very unusual provision, but parties, one represented or whether
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1

or not they are represented by counsel, have a right to

2

stipulate and agree to what, they want to stipulate to on their

3

agreements and unless there's something patently unfair about

4

it, the Court has an obligation to let them agree to what they

5 | want to agree to.
6
7

If that same thing had been presented to the Court without
the defendant being represented by competent counsel, the Court

8 | probably would have challenged it at the time or at least made
9

it clear to the parties as to what you are doing.

10

were represented by competent counsel.

11

chose to do what they did, certainly I don't know at this point

12) I may never know.
13

Both parties

Why in the world they

Defense counsel, of course, is saying it's

in the nature of alimony.

It sure sounds like it, and yet, the

14 stipulation clearly was that there is no alimony to be paid.
15j

Plaintiff's counsel is saying it's obviously property

16 settlement.

This is not obvious to me that it's property

17 settlement.

What is appears to the Court to be is that the

18 plaintiff was entitled to some alimony because of the length
19 of the time of their marriage and the defendant was adamantly
2° refusing to pay any alimony but he was agreeing for the sake of
21 the children to do something different, which is, I will pay the
22 house payment.
23

That helps the kids.

it helps my children.

It doesn't help me any but

At the same time I will pay child support

24 but I won't pay alimony.

That sounds to the Court like what

25 occurred but I can't say that's what occurred.

The only way
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1

that that can be done and mind you, I didn't hear the trial.

2 { I only heard a stipulation between the parties and so they
3

hammered out all of the details and they handed it to the

4

Court and I listened to it and I say, will you agree to it and

5

they say, will you agree to it and I said, yeah, I will agree

5

and I asked each of the parties if they will agree to it or if

7

that's really their agreement and if they say yes then we pro-

8

ceed on that basis and that's what occurred in this case.

9

The reporting clerk made rather detailed notes as to what

10 was agreed on.
11

So, as you each look at the decree to see what

it says I keep watching that minute entry to see the decree

12 matches the minute entry and the decree matches the minute entr Y\
13

It does say what the minute entry says they agreed to.

I don't

141 know if the defendant had some retirement that was being offset
15 and this is a consideration.

I don't know if they had some

16 other property that had some value that he was going to keep
17 that this was going to offset to.

I didn't know then and I

18 don't know now and I can't jump to a conclusion that it's
19 J alimony and it should be terminated.
20

I have to say that if it were alimony there has been no

21 showing that there is any change that would—The sheer making
22 of $15,100 for nine months a year is not in and of itself enough
23 J to stop alimony.

The fact that the defendant remarries isn't

241 enough by itself or with the fact of tne plaintiff having a good
25| salary.

I suppose good always is in quotes because none of us

39

sitting here would call $15,100 a good salary.
The Court doesn't know why the provision was put there.
It's odd to put it until the youngest is 18.
like some additional child support.

It makes it sound

It looks like it's probabl^

in lieu of alimony and yet, agreed there is no such thing as
alimony.

It could be property settlement.

Over a term of

11 years which is the approximate period of time until that
youngest child reaches 18, we are talking about $36,000.
are talking about a very significant sum

We

of money and yet, if

the parties want to agree on it and they apparently did, at
this time, it isn't like the defendant didn't know what he was
doing.

He may have thought about it the day after or the week

after and said, boy, what did I do, but sometime approximately-j
well, shortly less than two months he .puts his own signature to
the document drawn by his attorney.
At least it may not have been drawn—I guess by the plaintiff's attorney and agreed to by the defense attorney and as
counsel said, very unusual because he even had the defendant
sign it, which is unusual, but it tells me that he saw it and
undoubtedly considered it after it was drawn, not only on
strictly the day of the hearing.
So, I am going to hold the--unusual as it is, the terms as
it is, even though it's there without any offsetting equity in
the house even though it says there's no alimony.

It appears

to be two intelligent people agreeing and knowing what they

40

1

are agreeing to.

Can't tell you why, but the decree was there

2

and it will remain the same.

3

cide who is entitled to claim the children as deductions and

4

that can be amended to show that.

5

With regard to visitation.

Parties agree to let the IRS de-

Mr. Kerschner, if you cannot

6

fulfill your visitation you have no right to ask the plaintiff

7

to change her time with the children to match yours.

8

can ask her, but you have no right to demand it.

9

hand, Mrs. Kerschner, if he asks you if you agree, then you are

10 bound by it.

You cannot change.

Now, you

On the other-

I mean, it's true it doesn't

11 say it in the decree, but we expect parents to, when

they

12 mutually agree on something, they will be bound by it.
13

I don't know whether you agree to it or not, but if you

141 agree to a change then you will want to live up to your word.
15

Now, with regard to the phone visitation.

The children

16 ought to have phone visitation and it ought to be without any
17 eavesdropping from either party.
18 either.

I don't know if it's occuring,

We spent very little time on it.

Just say there ought

19 to be those rights and they ought to be respected.
20

With regard to the health and accident insurance, I think

21 we have got that cleared up.

The decree says that each party

22 will pay one-half of all medical bills not covered by insurance.
23 it doesn't make any difference, orthodonist or if it's an office
24 call and it's not paid by insurance.
25 so each pay one-half.

The decree says one-half,

While it's anticipated that only the
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gency has passed.5 It has been observed
that the overall trend has been in the direction of absoluteness rather than conditionally with increasing weight apparently
being given to the presumption against intestacy. 6
[3] Significantly, the testatrix did not
make any alternative' disposition of her
property if the asserted condition precedent
of the second paragraph was not fulfilled.
Since she devised nothing to her husband,
his death had no significant impact on her
overall testamentary disposition.
"The fact that the testator made no
express provision for forfeiture or gift
over upon failure of the condition tends
to show that he did not mean to impose a
condition." 7
This will, considered as a whole, shows a
manifest intention of the testatrix to make
an absolute will disposing of all of her property. While it may be inexpertly drawn, it
is sufficiently clear that she did not intend
to die intestate, if her husband did not
precede her in death. If a literal interpretation of the second paragraph could be
deemed to create an inconsistency with the
plain intent of the testatrix as unmistakably revealed in the remainder of the will,
then those words should be disregarded. 8
Furthermore, testatrix clearly specified her
intent and purpose to disinherit her six
grandchildren, who were the children of her
deceased son. It would be totally inconsistent with this avowed objective to construe
her will as showing an intent to die intestate if the condition precedent failed and
thus the grandchildren would inherit under
5. In re Trager's Estate, 413 111. 364, 108 N.E.2d
908, 910 (1952).
6.

1 A.L.R.3d 1048, Anno:
Determination
Whether Will Is Absolute Or Conditional, Sec.
3, p. 1052; also see 1 Page On Wills (Bowe-Parker Revision) Sec. 9.8, p. 428.

7. 5 Page On Wills (Bowe-Parker Revision) Sec.
44.2, p. 400.
8. Brasser v. Hutchison, 37 Colo.App. 528, 549

the laws of intestate succession.9 Such a
construction would produce an absurd result, clearly contrary to the intention of the
testatrix as it is ascertained from the four
corners of the will.
Testatrix clearly intended her two daughters, Tess and Gloria, to be the distributees
of all her property. This case is reversed
and remanded to the trial court with directions to proceed with the probate of the
estate in accordance with this opinion.
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS and
HALL, JJ.} concur.
STEWART, J., dissents.

Margaret FLETCHER, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
William I. FLETCHER, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 16407.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 18, 1930.

Husband appealed distribution of property and custodial arrangements for minor
9. See 4 Page On Wills (Bowe-Parker Revision)
Sec. 30.17, p. 115, wherein it is stated: "If
testator does not dispose of the whole of his
estate by his last will and testament, and such
will contains negative words of exclusion, the
great majority of states hold that such negative
words cannot prevent property from passing
under the statutes of descent and distribution.
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children in decree of divorce entered by
First District Court, Cache County, Ted S.
Perry, J. pro tern. The Supreme Court,
Maughan, J., held that: (1) under statute
governing disposition of property in divorce
proceedings and rulings thereunder, equity
of husband in home he purchased subsequent to wife's filing for divorce was properly considered marital asset subject to division in divorce decree; (2) evidence was
sufficient to support trial court's award of
alimony in sum of $300 per month for 162
months, provided that alimony was to terminate upon either husband's death or
wife's remarriage, as reasonable and appropriate sum for support and maintenance;
(3) fact that father had inculcated older
children with antagonistic attitudes toward
mother and other evidence was sufficient to
support trial court's award of custody of
older children to father and of three younger children to mother; and (4) trial court
did not abuse its discretion in decree requiring two-week notice to arrange visitation of
children by noncustodial parent.
Affirmed.

1. Divorce c=» 184(10)
In divorce case, even though proceedings are equitable and Supreme Court may
review evidence, Supreme Court accords
considerable deference to findings and
judgment of trial court due to its advantageous position.
2. Divorce < ^ 184(5), 184(10)
On appeal of divorce proceeding, Supreme Court will not disturb action of trial
court unless evidence clearly preponderates
to contrary, or trial court has abused its
discretion, or misapplied principles of law.
3. Divorce <s=> 252.2
There is no fixed formula in divorce
proceedings upon which to determine division of properties; it is prerogative of court
to make whatever disposition of property as
it deems fair, equitable, and necessary for
protection and welfare of mrtipQ

4. Divorce <s=»252.1, 286(8)
In division of marital property in divorce proceeding, trial judge has wide discretion, and his findings will not be disturbed unless record indicates abuse thereof.
5. Divorce o=>308
Court may not, under decree of divorce,
unless child has incapacity or disability, order transfer of property of either parent to
children for purpose of creating estate for
children's permanent benefit.
6. Divorce <s=>282
Theory urged by husband in objecting
to valuation of his presently vested interest
in certain retirement funds, which was not
presented to trial court in divorce proceed-ing, had to be deemed untimely when it was
first claimed on appeal.
7. Divorce c=>252.3(l)
Under statute governing disposition of
property in divorce proceedings and rulings
thereunder, equity of husband in home he
purchased subsequent to wife's filing for
divorce was properly considered marital asset subject to division in divorce decree.
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.
8. Divorce c=>253(3)
Marital estate is evaluated according to
existing property interests at time marriage
is terminated by decree of court. U.C.A.
1953, 30-3-5
9. Divorce c=>253(2)
Evidence in divorce proceeding did not
support conclusion that trial court abused
its discretion in division of marital assets in
divorce decree.
10. Divorce c=>286(8)
In reviewing division of marital property on appeal from divorce judgment, award
of alimony should not be included as marital asset which was distributed at time of
divorce.
11. Divorce c=»231, 240(2)
Function of alimony is to provide sup-
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dard of living she enjoyed during marriage
and to prevent wife from becoming public
charge; criteria considered in determining
reasonable award of support include financial conditions and needs of wife, ability of
wife to produce sufficient income for herself, and ability of husband to provide support.
12. Divorce <s=>231
Alimony awarded in divorce proceeding, which was not sum certain but was
terminable on certain contingencies, could
not be deemed in nature of property settlement.
13. Divorce c=>240(3)
Evidence in divorce proceeding was
sufficient to sustain trial court's finding
thai sum of $300 per month for 162 months
awarded for alimony, provided that alimony
was to terminate upon death of husband or
wife's remarriage, was reasonable and appropriate sum for support and maintenance.
14. Divorce c=>224
Supreme Court would not order that
each party to divorce proceeding pay own
attorney's fees where trial court had conferred more favorable adjustment of resources to husband in consideration of husband's obligation to pay attorney's fees.
15. Divorce c=*287
Since, on appeal from divorce judgment, there were number of factors to be
considered in determining whether attorney's fees should be awarded appellee for
defending appeal, in addition to question as
to which party prevailed on appeal, case
would be remanded to trial court to determine whether award of attorney's fees
should be made, and if so, amount thereof.
16. Divorce < ^ 298(1)
Fact that father had inculcated attitudes antagonistic to mother in older children and other evidence was sufficient to
support award of custody of three older
children to father and three younger children to mother m divorce proceeding.

17. Divorce c=*299
Trial court did not abuse its discretion
in decree requiring two-week notice to arrange visitation of children by noncustodial
parent where, by reason of strong animosities generated over custody issu<\ requirement of rather formalized arrangements
until all parties invoked had time to organize their new lifestyles and gain greater
insight as to their problems could not be
deemed inappropriate, interim solution.
18. Divorce c=>310
Trial court did not err in awarding
child support until each child to broken
marriage attained age of 19 where statute
conferred power on trial court in divorce
action to award support to age 21, and
where trial court made special findings concerning need for child support to age of 19.

Lyle W Hillvard of Hillyard, Low &
Anderson, Logan, for defendant and appellant
B L. Dart of Dart & Stegall, Salt Lake
City, Bruce L. Jorgensen of Olson, Hoggan
& Sorenson, Logan, for plaintiff and respondent
MAUGHAN, Justice.
Defendant-husband appeals the distribution of property and custodial arrangements
for the minor children in a decree of divorce. The judgment of the trial court is
affirmed Costs to plaintiff. All statutory
references are to Utah Code Annotated,
1953.
The parties were married in June 1961,
they are the parents of six children, who at
the time the decree was entered in March
1979, were the ages of 16, 15, 14, 8, 7 and 4.
Defendant was awarded custody of the
three older children and plaintiff was given
custody of the three younger ones.
At the time of marriage defendant had
completed two years of college, and plaintiff was a graduate nurse. During the
course of the marriage defendant has
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earned bachelor's and master's degrees as
well as taking additional classes in his specialty. At the time of trial, he was a tenured associate professor of electrical engineering at a state university, with a gross
salary of $28,426, exclusive of fringe benefits. In addition, defendant was a principal
shareholder in a close corporation engaged
in rendering professional services in his
field. In 1978, defendant received approximately $13,275 in wages and $7,500 in loans
from this corporation.
Plaintiff, throughout the marriage, has
worked as necessary to supplement the
family income, assist in funding her husband's education, or to provide a down payment on the family's real property. At the
time of trial, plaintiff was employed halftime as a nurse and her net earnings per
month were approximately $613.
In the distribution of the assets, plaintiff
was awarded the equity in the family home,
her automobile, some of the home furnishings, and her personal belongings. The
court found the value of this property to be
$31,200. Plaintiff was required to assume
and discharge a mortgage in the sum of
$29,208 on the home. Plaintiff was awarded alimony in the sum of $300 per month
for a period of 162 months, with the provision the alimony would terminate on her
remarriage or defendant's death. Plaintiff
was further awarded child support in the
amount of $150 per month per child and
$5,000 to apply towards her attorney's fees.
Defendant was awarded assets, which the
trial court found had the value of $63,126.
These assets included a parcel of unimproved land, a new home, his automobile,
certain items of household furniture, his
gun collection and certain other items of
personal property, the current value of his
equity in a retirement fund and other investments.
The trial of this case extended over a
period of four days, a considerable period of
this time was directed to the issue of custody of the six children. The plaintiffs evidence indicated a calculated course of con-

duct on the part of defendant to alienate
the children from her and to inculcate feelings of animosity and contempt for her.
Defendant denied this charge and claimed
that as the marital relationship had disintegrated plaintiff had withdrawn from involvement with the family, and defendant
had merely attempted to fill the vacuum so
that the family could continue functioning
as an integrated unit.
The trial court found plaintiff had incurred the disrespect of the children by
reason of defendant's actions. Defendant
had either intentionally or unwittingly involved the three older children in the custody dispute between the parties; so the children's loyalty to defendant had resulted in
their rejection of plaintiff. However, neither parent was found unfit. The trial
court recited its adherence to the standard
of "the best interests of the child" in resolving the custodial issues. In its findings, the
trial court contrasted the characters of the
parties and found plaintiff a better example
of honesty, morality, courtesy, and unselfishness. Defendant was found to have established better communication with the
children, but plaintiffs withdrawal was attributed to the emotional distress precipitated by defendant. The trial court acknowledged and rejected the recommendation of the social worker that the children
should remain together, and, because of the
alienation of the older children towards
their mother, the custody of the children
should be given to th<" father. The trial
court expressed the view the social worker
had not considered the long range effect in
making the recommendation, and the court
questioned whether defendant could, in
fact, devote sufficient time to six children
and still meet the demands of his profession. The two younger daughters were
found to be well adjusted in their present
environment. Based on the foregoing factors, the older children were awarded to
defendant and the younger children to
plaintiff, subject to reasonable visitation
rights in the non-custodial parent. However, the court provided the visitation must
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be arranged by the mutual consent of the
parties two weeks in advance.

mere trustee to manage the funds for his
minor children.

[1, 2] In a divorce case, even though the
proceedings are equitable and this Court
may review the evidence,1 this Court accords considerable deference to the findings
and judgment of the trial court due to its
advantageous position. On appeal this
Court will not disturb the action of the trial
court unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary, or the trial court has
abused its discretion, or misapplied principles of law.2 In application of these precepts to the record herein there is no basis
to interfere with the decision of the trial
court.

[5] These funds were held solely in defendant's name, and he received certain tax
benefits incidental thereto. He made no
attempt to transfer them to the children
under the uniform gifts to minors provisions of Section 75-5-601, et seq. His testimony indicated no more than an intention
in the future to use the funds for the children. He retained exclusive dominion and
controll over them. He merely indicated he
would have no objection if the court ordered him to place them in trust for the
benefit of the children. A court may not,
under a decree of divorce, unless a child has
an incapacity or disability, order the transfer of the property of either parent to the
children for the purpose of creating an estate for their permanent benefit. 5

DISTRIBUTION

OF

ASSETS

[3,4] There is no fixed formula upon
which to determine a division of properties,
it is a prerogative of the court to make
whatever disposition of property as it
deems fair, equitable, and necessary for the
protection and welfare of the parties. 3 In
the division of marital property, the trial
judge has wide discretion, and his findings
will not be disturbed unless the record indicates an abuse thereof.4
Defendant contends the trial court erred
in including as part of the marital assets
subject to division certain investments identified as SNI funds. These funds were
awarded to defendant, and the sum of
$6,000 for these investments was included
in the calculation of defendant's total
award. Defendant characterized these as
educational funds for the three older children, and claims he should be deemed as a
I. Article VIII, Sec. 9, Constitution of Utah.
2., Eastman v. Eastman, Utah, 558 P.2d 514
(1976); Watson v. Watson, Utah, 561 P.2d 1072
(1977); Pope v. Pope, Utah, 589 P.2d 752
(1978).
3. Pearson v. Pearson, Utah, 561 P.2d 1080
(1977); Hamilton v. Hamilton, Utaji, 562 P.2d
235 (1977); Naylor v. Naylor, Utah, 563 P.2d

[6] Defendant furthe; objects to the
valuation of his presently vested interest in
certain retirement funds. The valuation of
$16,939 as the current fair market value
was presented by a witness called by defendant. There was no other evidence adduced as to value. The theory urged by
defendant was not presented to the trial
court and must be deemed untimely when it
is first claimed on appeal.
[7,8] Defendant contends his equity in
a home he purchased subsequent to plaintiff's filing for divorce should not have been
considered a marital asset subject to division. Such an argument is contrary to the
specific provisions of Section 30-3-5,
U.C.A., 1953, and the rulings of this court in
accordance therewith. The marital estate
is evaluated according to the existing prop184 (1977); Gramme
P.2d 144 (1978).
4. Jesperson
(1980).

v. Gramme,

v. Jesperson,

Utah, 587

Utah, 610 P.2d 326

5. English v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409, 412
0977).
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erty interests at the time the marriage is
terminated by the decree of the court. 6
Defendant argues the division of the
marital property was inequitable by reason
of the trial court's failure to give sufficient
weight and consideration to the liabilities.
During the pendency of these proceedings
defendant purchased a home for $90,000, his
equity therein was found by the trial court
to be $6,500, which was awarded to him.
By taking this liability and the total sum he
may potentially pay as alimony, defendant
calculates the net value distributed to him
will be in a negative amount, while the net
value awarded to plaintiff will be $50,624.
(This amount is derived by adding $31,232
of assets awarded to plaintiff to $48,600
alimony and subtracting the mortgage of
$29,208 on the home awarded to plaintiff.)
Defendant urges a more equitable division
would apportion the marital debts pro rata.
[9-11] Significantly, defendant has not
specifically claimed the trial court abused
its discretion in the division of the marital
assets, and such a claim could not be sustained by the records. Furthermore, the
award of alimony should not be included as
a marital asset which was distributed at the
time of divorce. As this Court observed in
English v. English,7 there is a distinction
between the division of assets accumulated
during marriage, which are distributed
upon an equitable basis, and the post marital duty of support and maintenance. The
function of alimony is to provide support
for the wife as nearly as possible at the
standard of living she enjoyed during marriage and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge. Criteria considered in
determining a reasonable award of support
include the financial conditions and needs
of the wife, the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient income for herself, and the
ability of the husband to provide support. 8
6. Hamilton v. Hamilton, Utah, 562 P.2d 235
(1977); Jesperson v. Jesperson, Utah, 610 P.2d
326 (1980).
7. Note 5 supra, at pp. 411-412 of 565 P.2d.
8. Also see Gramme v. Gramme, Utah, 587 P.2d
144 (1978).

The trial court distributed approximately
one-third of the marital assets to plaintiff
and two-thirds to defendant In its findings the trial court stated:
"The Court finds that in lieu of ordering a cash settlement with a lien on the
Defendant's property to equalize the
property settlement, it is reasonable to
award the Plaintiff alimony in the sum of
$300.00 per month for 162 months, . .
provided, however, that said alimony is to
terminate upon either Defendant's death
or plaintiff's remarriage."
The Court further found such an award
resulted in a lower figure than would be the
case if a cash settlement for the difference
were imposed to be repaid at $300.00 per
month at eight percent interest, but the
Court also took into consideration the court
costs and attorney's fees the defendant
must pay.
[12,13] The alimony awarded in this action cannot be deemed in the nature of a
property settlement, for it is not a sum
certain but is terminable on certain contingencies. The record in the case will sustain
the alimony award as an appropriate sum
for support and maintenance. Plaintiff introduced into evidence a budget indicating
family needs. (She had excluded the costs
of real property taxes and insurance because she was unfamiliar with specific
amounts.) Her income was limited by parttime employment so she might give adequate care and nurturing to the three
younger children, ranging in age from four
to eight. Defendant had sufficient income
to provide support. The record sustains
trial court's finding that the sum awarded
for alimony was reasonable. 9
[14, 15] In continuation of his fallacious
contention that there must be an equaliza9. As explained in Jesperson v. Jesperson, note
6 supra, 610 P.2d 326, 328, this court is inclined
to affirm a trial court's decision whenever it
can be done on proper grounds, even though
the trial court may have assigned an incorrect
reason for its ruling.
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tion of the assets, defendant argues each
party should pay his own attorney's fees.
This argument is without merit. As noted,
ante, the trial court had conferred a more
favorable adjustment of resources in consideration of defendant's obligation to pay attorney's fees. Plaintiff has urged she be
.awarded attorney's fees expended in defending this appeal. However, in addition
to the question as to which party prevailed
on appeal, there are a number of factors to
be considered in determining whether attorney's fees should be awarded. Accordingly,
as to that issue, this case is remanded to the
trial court to determine whether an award
of attorney's fees should be made, and if so,
the amount thereof.10
CUSTODIAL
ARRANGEMENT
CHILD SUPPORT

AND

Defendant contends it would have been
in the best interest of the children to award
the custody of all the children to him. As
noted ante, the trial court made extensive
findings of fact concerning the custody of
the children and utilized as the standard in
making its determination, the best interests
of the children. Since the older children
had exhibited such a deep antagonism towards their mother, she expressed concern
about compelling them to live with her.
Defendant, whom the trial court found to
have intentionally or unwittingly contributed to the alienation of the older children,
now urges he is the only parent capable and
willing to assume the custody of the six
children.
[16] The potential damage defendant
has wrought by his course of conduct cannot be underestimated, and it cannot be
deemed to be in the best interests of the
children to grant their custody to one who
has inculcated the attitudes exhibited by
the older children. The record and findings
10. Ehninger v. Ehninger, Utah, 569 P.2d 1104
(1977).

,*
11.

Cox v. Cox, Utah, 532 P.2d 994 (1975).

indicate plaintiff would be the superior custodial parent. The trial court faced the
dilemma of compelling three teenagers
against their will to live with their mother.
To avoid further conflict and the potential
of further exacerbating the unfortunate division in this tragic family, the custody of
the older children was granted to defendant. Both the trial court and plaintiff exhibited wisdom in making this difficult
choice, and there is no basis for this Court
to intervene. This Court will not upset the
trial court's judgment in custodial matters
unless it is persuasively shown to te contrary to the best interests and welfare of
the children and family.11
[17] Defendant contends the provision
in the decree requiring a two-week notice to
arrange visitation constituted a clear abuse
of discretion by the trial court. This proviso is not engraved in stone and is subject to
modification as are all custodial arrangements. By reason of the strong animosities
generated over the custody issue, the requirement of rather formalized arrangements until all the parties involved have
had time to organize their new life-styles
and gain greater insight as to their problems, cannot be deemed an inappropriate,
interim solution.
[18] Finally, defendant contends the trial court erred in awarding child support
until each child attains the age of nineteen.
Section 15-2-1, confers power on the trial
court in a divorce action to award support
to age twenty-one. This Court has ruled
the trial court must make a special finding
to justify such an order. 12 In adherence
with this standard the trial court made a
special finding concerning the need for
child support to the age of nineteen. Thus,
defendant's claim is without merit.
CROCKETT, C. J., and HALL, WILKINS
and STEWART, JJ., concur.
12. Harris v. Harris, Utah, 585 P.2d 435 (1978);
Carlson v. Carlson, Utah, 584 P.2d 864 (1978);
Ferguson v. Ferguson, Utah, 578 P.2d 1274
(1978).
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1. Divorce <3=>164
the defendant failed to refer to any portion
of the record that factually supports his
Party seeking modification of divorce
contentions on appeal. This Court will as- decree
must
demonstrate
substantial
sume the correctness of the judgment below change of circumstances. U.C.A. 1953, 30if counsel on appeal does not comply with 3-5.
the requirements of Rule 75(p)(2)(2)(d),
2. Divorce <3=>164
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as to making
Change in circumstances required to
a concise statement of facts and citation of
justify
modification of divorce decree varies
the pages in the record where they are
4
with
type
of modification sought. U.C.A.
supported.
1953, 30-3-5.
The judgment is affirmed.
3. Divorce c=> 245(2)
There was substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of alimony award where, since divorce, former
O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM
wife had obtained employment, experienced
substantial increase in income, and accumulated some savings, while former husband
had retired and received income in approximately the same amount as he received at
time
of divorce some 17 years previously.
Mary Ruth HASLAM, Plaintiff
U.C.A.
1953, 30-3-5.
and Respondent,
v.
James Vincent HASLAM, Defendant
and Appellant.

Leland S. McCullough, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
Mar}r Ruth Haslam, pro se.

No. 18013.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 31, 1982.

Former husband appealed from an order of the Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, G. Hal Taylor, J., dismissing his
motion to terminate alimony. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that there
was substantial change in circumstances
warranting modification of the alimony
award where, since the divorce, former wife
had obtained employment, experienced a
substantial increase in income, and accumulated some savings, while former husband
had retired and received income in approximately the same amount as he received at
the time of the divorce some 17 years previously.
Reversed and remanded,
4.

Lepasiotes

*

v. Dinsdale, 121 Utah 359, 242

STEWART, Justice:
The issue in this case is whether the trial
court erred in dismissing defendant's motion to terminate alimony on the ground
that the defendant had failed to demonstrate a "change of circumstances" sufficient to warrant termination.
In 1945 the parties were married and
subsequently had two children. In 1966 the
plaintiff obtained a divorce and upon an
agreement between the parties an order
was entered directing the defendant to pay
$200 a month alimony plus child support.
The child support has since then terminated
by virtue of the children's reaching their
majority. At the time of the divorce, defendant earned between $1000 and $1200
per month, and the plaintiff was unemployed.
In 1972, some six years after the divorce,
the defendant remarried, and in 1980 he
P.2d 297 (1952).
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retired. The trial court found that at the
time of the hearing defendant's health and
age did not permit him to work. The defendant now receives Social Security in the
amount of $532.80, pension benefits in the
amount of $618.09, and approximately $100
from stock dividends, for a total of
$1,250.89. He receives an additional $229
from Social Security for his present wife
and $229 for her minor child by a former
husband. The household income therefore
totals $1,708.89 and expenses total
$1,607.83.
Plaintiff, subsequent to the divorce, secured a job and now earns $1,100 per
month. In addition to the $200 alimony,
she draws interest from $12,000 in savings.
She has not remarried and claims expenses
in the amount of $1,606. The trial court
dismissed defendant's petition for a modification, finding that there had been no material change of circumstances.
Defendant's contention is that his income
is approximately the same as it was in 1966,
and the plaintiff's income has increased
dramatically. He argues that it is unfair to
require him to supplement the plaintiff's
income when she has about the same income as he does and no dependents.
[1, 2] The district court has "continuing
jurisdiction" in divorce cases "to make such
subsequent changes or new orders with respect to the support and maintenance of the
parties . . . as shall be reasonable and necessary." U.C.A., 1953, § 30-3-5. To provide some stability to decrees, however, and
to prevent an inundation of the courts with
petitions for modification, a party seeking a
modification must demonstrate a substantial change of circumstances. E.g., Adams
v. Adams, Utah, 593 P.2d 147 (1979). The
change in circumstances required to justify
a modification of a divorce decree varies
with the type of modification sought.
Foulger v. Foulger, Utah, 626 P.2d 412
(1981). As to cases involving a petition to
change the custody of children, see Hogge
v. Hogge, Utah, 649 P.2d 51 (1982). As to
changes in the disposition of real property,
see Despain v. Despain, Utah, 610 P.2d 1303
(1980); Land v. Land, Utah, 605 P.2d 1248
(1980).

With respect to modifying alimony, this
Court has recently stated that "provisions
in the original decree of divorce granting
alimony, child support, and the like must be
readily susceptible to alteration at a later
date, as the needs which such provisions
were designed to fill are subject to rapid
and unpredictable change." Foulger v.
Foulger, Utah, 626 P.2d 412 (1981).
[3] On the instant facts it is clear that
there has been a substantial change in circumstances. Since the divorce, the former
Mrs. Haslam has obtained employment, experienced a substantial increase in income
and has accumulated some savings. Mr.
Haslam has retired and presently receives
income in approximately the same amount
as he received at the time of the divorce
some seventeen years ago.
Under the circumstances of this case, we
think that the combination of the supporting spouse's retirement, together with the
dependent spouse's employment, earning of
a substantial income, and accumulation of
substantial savings subsequent to the original divorce decree, constitutes a substantial
change of circumstances. See Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 416 A.2d 45 (1980), and cases
cited. Therefore, defendant's petition for
modification is reinstated and the case remanded so that the trial court may consider
whether the alimony award should be modified as equity requires under the circumstances.
Reversed and remanded.
spondent.

Costs to re-

HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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Sharon Mae DAVIS, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Charles Francis DAVIS, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 18077.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Sept. 22, 1982.
Husband appealed from a decree of
divorce entered by the Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, G. Ha! Taylor, J., challenging the property division. The Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) financial arrangement on marital home, awarding husband one half of equity in property
at time of trial plus one half of any increase
accruing in future due to inflation but failing to provide husband any interest in increased equity in house which would result
by virtue of his paying alimony designed to
cover amount of second mortgage payment,
was inequitable, and (2) award of one third
of out-of-state property, acquired by husband prior to marriage but paid for, in part,
from joint account during marriage, to wife
and two-thirds to husband was within ambit of trial court's discretion.
Remanded.
1. Divorce <s» 252.5(1)
Divorce decree's financial arrangement
on marital home, which awarded husband
one half of equity in property at time of
trial plus one half of any increase accruing
in future due to inflation but failed to
provide him any interest in increased equity
in house which would result by virtue of his
paying alimony designed to cover amount
of second mortgage payment, was inequitable where, when amount of life insurance
premiums and interest on second mortgage
balance were added to mortgage balance,
husband would be required to make postdecree payments totalling amount nearly double equity awarded him, all proceeds of
second mortgage loan went into improve-

ment of house, and husband had no right to
possession.
2. Divorce o=>252.3(3)
Divorce award of one third of out-ofstate property, acquired by husband prior to
marriage but paid for, in part, from joint
account during marriage, to wife and twothirds to husband was within ambit of trial
court's discretion, notwithstanding that
three fourths of purchase price was paid
prior to marriage.

Henry S. Nygaard, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and appellant.
Paul H. Liapis, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.
HOWE, Justice:
This is an appeal by the defendant
Charles Francis Davis from a decree of
divorce entered in an action brought
against, him by his wife, Sharon Mae Davis,
plaintiff. He challenges the division of
property made by the trial court.
The parties were married on March 5,
1974. Both had been previously married.
Plaintiff gave up a $150 per month alimony
award from her previous divorce when she
married the. defendant. The plaintiff had
three children by her first marriage and
she, the children and the defendant lived
together in a house which she owned at the
time of her marriage to the defendant.
The plaintiff was employed during the last
two years of the marriage and at the time
of trial was earning $687 net per month.
She also received child support from her
former husband.
No children were born to the parties.
During the six years they lived together
they expended substantial amounts of money to improve the house. The defendant
paid the plaintiffs former husband $1,300
to satisfy a lien he held on the property.
Although the plaintiff disputed it, he
claimed that he further invested in it money which he had received as an inheritance
from his mother's estate, as well as money
he received from a personal injury settle-
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ment. There is no dispute that shortly before the separation of the parties they
obtained a second mortgage loan to remodel
part of the house and to make an addition
of 450 square feet. The balance on that
mortgage at the time of trial was $15,876.27. The monthly payments v/ere $345.
Prior to their marriage, the defendant in
1967 purchased under contract four one-half
acre lots in New Mexico for $6,200. Threefourths of that price was paid prior to the
marriage in 1974 and the balance of the
contract was paid from their joint account
during the marriage.
The trial court apparently concluded
from the evidence that the equity of the
parties in the house had increased $23,000
during the marriage. It awarded the defendant one-half of that equity ($11,500)
plus one-half of any increase which may
accrue in the future due to inflation and
made that award payable when the plaintiff remarried, sold the property or her
youngest child attained the age of 18 years.
The court further ordered the defendant to
pay to the plaintiff $420 per month alimony
until such time as the second mortgage had
been paid in full, and ordered that he maintain sufficient insurance on his life to insure payment of the mortgage balance in
the event of his death. An order was made
that the parties sell the New Mexico lots
and divide the proceeds between them as
follows: One-third to plaintiff and twothirds to defendant.
The defendant's main contention is that
it was inequitable for the trial court to deny
him any interest in the increased equity in
the house which will result by virtue of his
paying alimony designed to cover the
amount of the second mortgage payment.
Defendant refers us to the Conclusions of
Law in which the trial judge took the
monthly payment on the second mortgage
of $345 and added to it $75 for the general
support of the plaintiff, and then ordered
the defendant to pay a total of $420 each
month to her, terming it alimony.
[1] We agree that,, this financial arrangement on the house was inequitable.
The trial court properly awarded the de-

fendant one-half of the equity in the property at the time of trial plus one-half of any
increase accruing in the future due to inflation. It wisely provided that such equity
should not be payable to the defendant until plaintiff shoulu remarry, sell the property, or until her youngest child attained the
age of 18 years. This provision assured the
plaintiff and her children a place to live.
But after having done that, the trial court
upset the equicy of that division by requiring the defendant to make a further substantial investment in the property without
any corresponding benefit to him. When
the amount of the life insurance premiums
and the interest on the second mortgage
balance are added to the mortgage balance,
the defendant will be required to make post
decree payments totalling an amount nearly
double the equity awarded to him. This
was unfair to him and weighted the division
of the property heavily in the plaintiffs
favor. Fairness dictates that he should realize something out of the increased equity
which will result from his providing the
funds to retire the second mortgage. The
unfairness is evident when it is considered
that all the proceeds of the second mortgage loan went into the improvement of the
house. Also, he has no right to possession.
It should also be noted that he was ordered
to pay approximately $9,000 of debts and
$1,000 attorney's fees for his wife. The
decree should be amended to allow the defendant's participation to the extent of onehalf in the increased equity brought about
by the reduction of or retirement of the
second mortgage.
[2] We find no error in the division of
the New Mexico property. Although it was
contracted for and partially paid for prior
to the marriage, a substantial number of
the monthly payments were made after the
marriage. We find it to be within the
ambit of discretion of the trial court to
award the plaintiff one-third of that property and two-thirds to the defendant.
Remanded to the trial court to amend the
decree in conformance with this opinion.
Each party to bear his or her own costs.
HALL, C.J, and STEWART, OAKS and
DURHAM, J J., concur.

